We can start with the following intuitive characterization of non-reductive physicalism about the mental: Baker, How else might we understand the relevant sense of priority, then?
One worry for this proposal, however, is this: Where a concrete fact is a fact concerning the existence and nature of concrete entities, let metaphysical foundationalism be the thesis that every concrete fact is either fundamental or derivative with respect to fundamental concrete facts.
It follows that the grounding-strike thesis is false. Similarly, the issue at hand over monism is precisely the same question. Some proponents of grounding claim that we can understand truthmaking in terms of grounding, and doing so helps us resolve longstanding problems regarding truthmaking, such as the problem of negative existentials Cameron forthcoming; Liggins ; Schaffer b.
Three challenges to irreflexivity are as follows. A putative counterexample to the asymmetry of grounding that we adapt from Rodriguez-Pereyra is as follows: Instead, they suggest, we should return to a decidedly Aristotelian project, a study of what grounds what.
Instead of asking what exists we should be asking how things exist. Grounding also points to an intuition that it is right to believe in a hierarchy of metaphysical commitments, what is prior to Grounding essays on metaphysical priority. Third, if grounding is indeed an SPO, it may still be that the grounding conception of metaphysical foundationalism is implausible for different reasons.
We suspect, however, that with any purely modal characterization of non-reductive physicalism we will encounter similar problems Horgan See Horgan and Potrc for a defense of the claim that there is only one concrete object.
Here is a simple grounding-theoretic proposal: But suppose that the existence facts concerning regions are also grounded in the existence facts concerning points.
If we have an independent grip on the notion of intrinsicality, and the notion really is analyzable in terms of the notion of grounding, then pointing to how these concepts are related does seem to enhance our understanding of grounding. Putting aside indiscriminately essential properties e.
For example, apparent facts about the mental are grounded in entities that determine the apparent fact. Well, the thesis is associated with the claim that grounding is well-founded. A direction for future research on grounding—be it ultimately friendly or hostile to the notion—is that of addressing these, and related, concerns.
The same applies, mutatis mutandis, to all the other facts that are links in the grounding chain in question. See Bader for more on why grounding may be relevant to intrinsicality, and Marshall forthcoming for objections to the idea that we can analyze intrinsicality in terms of grounding.
See both deRosset and Sider The motive for thinking this way is spurred by the intuition that things are dependent in some way. The second proposal is that ground is grounded in a fact that speaks directly to the connection between picket and strike.
As Koslicki points out, these relations are importantly different. Entailment is reflexive, supervenience can be symmetrical, identity is both reflexive and symmetrical and truthmaking does not chain. One straightforward grounding-theoretic proposal is this: The right hand side of this biconditional, however, is something that many would accept!
There are at least three points worth keeping in mind about the grounding conception of metaphysical foundationalism. And as Wilson notes many think that determinables are identical to disjunctions of their possible determinates.
Consider Euclidean space, which is comprised of points and regions that include those points.
If such facts lack grounds we must again reject the grounding-strike thesis. Consider this statement by Kevin Corcoran: However, many grounding advocates suggest that the notion of grounding relates primarily to facts themselves while maintaining that some facts are more fundamental than other facts.
And Rosen proposes an account of intrinsic properties in terms of grounding that is free of modal notions as well: One issue is this: Understanding the Structure of Reality Schaffer argues that such a project is far more permissive about what exists: Further potential applications of grounding concern perceptual knowledge Chudnofftemporal ontology Baronand the nature of mental content Trogdon forthcoming.
Indeed, he suggests that this is really the question we are asking. The debate over the mind and material, according to Schaffer, is not about whether either exists, but about whether mind is grounded in matter.
Grounding, for example, remains a central task in theology proper.The Unity and Priority Arguments for Grounding Jessica Wilson Introduction Grounding, understood as a primitive posit operative in contexts where metaphysical dependence is at issue, is not able on its own to do any substan - 7 The Unity and Priority Arguments for Grounding physical—reductive physicalism, non-reductive physicalism.
METAPHYSICAL GROUNDING Some of the most eminent and enduring philosophical questions concern matters of priority: what is prior to what? What ‘grounds’ This volume of new essays, by leading figures in contemporary metaphysics, is the first to.
grounding, taken as a metaphysical primitive, is too opaque to do the explanatory work on which its hopefuls bank: it is supposed to be the glue that holds reality together, but is irredeemably mysterious.
(SPA1) Grounding and other forms of metaphysical priority asks whether important notions of metaphysical priority distinct from metaphysical grounding (e.g. ontological dependence and truth-making) can nevertheless be defined in terms of it.
This volume of new essays, by leading figures in contemporary metaphysics, is the first to address and investigate the metaphysical idea that certain facts are grounded in other facts. An introduction introduces and surveys the debate, examining its history as well as its central systematic aspects.5/5(1).
A metaphysical grounding claim explains, or accounts for, an apparent fact. If one is confronted with a fact, for example, that human beings can think in a unified way about the world, then one looks for a metaphysical ground that accounts for that fact.Download